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The Tunisian revolution not only liberated 
the country of its tenacious autocratic 
ruler, it also impacted, in a profound way, 
the imagination of prevailing political 
subjectivities. After Ben Ali fled the coun-
try, unsettled post-colonial tensions over 
the delineation of these changing subjec-
tivities re-emerged, coloring outside the 
lines of the nation. The present paper ana-
lyzes this contentious process of becom-
ing through an iconological analysis of 
the entangled dynamics of re-imagina-
tion that the national flag underwent dur-
ing the Tunisian revolution, starting from 
the liberation phase in December 2010, 
through the constitutional phase and the 
promulgation of the new constitution in 
2014, until the inauguration of the 
National Flag Square in March 2017.  The 
present iconological analysis is not only 
paradoxically witness to the very limita-
tion of the power of icons to engender 
dignified relationalities within a given 
nation, but is also witness to the slow clo-
sure of the revolutionary space and the 
gradual blockage of revolutionary pro-
cesses of subject formation. This block-
age was productive for the precarious 
restoration of national unity and state 
prestige necessary for the completion of 
the new constitution, but less for the 
demands for liberty, social justice and 
dignity so central to the revolution. 
Keywords: Tunisia, Revolution, Flag, 
Iconology, Subjectivity, Nationalism 
The colors and forms of subjectivity
Reflected in the glass case of a popcorn 
machine during the tumultuous occupa-
tion of the Kasbah square in February 2011, 
the image of a fluttering national banner 
poetically suggests the irreversibility of 
subject formation, popping like corn dur-
ing the revolution. The layered video, shot 
by visual artist Halim Karabibene, reminds 
us of how the unified Tunisian masses 
regained a sense of collective agency 
through the creative reappropriation of 
the quintessential icon of the nation, the 
Tunisian flag (see fig.1).
For decades the Tunisian population was 
depicted, not only externally by an 
Orientalist gaze, but also by an internal-
ized inferiority complex, as a homoge-
neous, passive and apolitical mass under 
the control of a resilient autocratic regime. 
Not only through the enunciation of the 
people (Marzouki “People to Citizens”; De 
Smet ”Dialectical Pedagogy”; Zemni 
“Revolution”), but also through the cre-
ative reappropriation and diversion of the 
rallying image of the nation, the local 
revolt in the marginalized interior and 
south of the country gradually shifted into 
a national insurrection. Consequently, the 
masses, unified under the reclaimed 
national banner, not only succeeded in 
their spontaneous effort to expel their 
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Figure 1: “The Popcorn Revolution”. Karabibene, 
Tunisia 2011.
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tory only to make his scripted appearance 
at the scene of revolution” (26). 
Subjectivities are indeed spontaneously 
re-imagined and re-invented during the 
revolutionary struggle itself. The process 
of re-imagination the national flag under-
went during the Tunisian Revolution is 
evidence of these changing subjectivities. 
Moreover, the revolution did not stop 
after Ben ‘Ali and his government were 
overthrown. Nor did the post-revolution-
ary phase start after his ousting. Following 
Hannah Arendt’s analysis On Revolution 
(Zemni “The Extraordinary Politics”; 
“Revolution”), the overthrow of the gov-
ernment can be regarded as merely the 
first phase of liberation. After this first 
phase a new political order had to be cre-
ated. The constitutive phase then dis-
closes the struggle of all the fragmented, 
pluralistic and conflicting forces that 
made up the unified people in the phase 
of liberation. It is in the light of this consti-
tutive phase that some academics openly 
accused Islamist parties and groups of 
attempting to hijack and steal the revolu-
tion (Omri “Perils of Identity”). Others saw 
it as a continuation of unresolved histori-
cal questions over identity and symbolic 
meanings related to how the nation 
understands itself, that not only included 
Islamists, but society as a whole (Zemni 
“The Extraordinary Politics”; McCarthy 
“Tunisian Uprising”). If the post-revolu-
tionary phase thus only started with the 
promulgation of the new constitution, we 
will indeed have to include in our analysis 
the struggle by all the different political 
actors engaged in a battle for a new col-
lective political subjectivity, through the 
contestation of the historic delineation of 
the national flag. 
From a grounded iconological analysis of 
the Tunisian flag, emerging subjectivities 
will be spelled out through the entangled 
process of re-imagination of the national 
flag, starting from the liberation phase in 
2010, through the constitutional phase 
and the promulgation of the new constitu-
tion in 2014, until the inauguration of the 
National Flag Square in March 2017. The 
dynamics of difference or alterity at the 
core of every iconological struggle makes 
it the perfect site to scrutinize the pro-
cesses of subject formation and go 
beyond prevailing divisions and mutual 
exclusivities in the building of this new 
polis that the revolution is striving for 
(Kathib Image Politics). The Tunisian 
Revolution and the subjectivities emerg-
ing out of the revolution have hitherto too 
often been read teleologically instead of 
genealogically, missing not only the histo-
ries but also the presents these histories 
produce (LeVine “Theorizing 
Revolutionary”). To better grasp the power 
mechanisms behind these emergences, a 
post-colonial perspective can provide 
proper insights (Mullin “Tunisian 
Uprising”). Present in the revolutionary 
dynamics, often described as a second 
independence, postcolonial fault-lines are 
too often overlooked when considering 
how new political subjects emerge or 
existing ones fundamentally change 
throughout revolutionary dynamics (De 
Smet “Dialectical Pedagogy”). 
The intricate connection between the re-
imagination of the national flag and the 
formation of new subjectivities during the 
Tunisian revolution are analyzed taking 
into account possible pitfalls of national 
consciousness as elaborated by Frantz 
Fanon. Processes of liberation fundamen-
tally transform prevailing subjectivities, as 
they forcefully pierce interiorized forms of 
depreciated self-understanding. Subject 
(trans-)formations are not the product of 
supernatural powers, but born out of revo-
lutionary processes directed to liberated 
forms of self-understanding. As “men [sic] 
change at the same time that they change 
the world”, struggle “remodels the con-
sciousness that man [sic] has of himself, 
and of his former dominators or of the 
world, at last within his reach” (Fanon, 
Dying Colonialism 30). It is in this national 
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process of becoming that the seeds of 
new dignified subjectivities are located. 
This process is essential for our analysis, as 
it “renews the symbols, the myths, the 
beliefs, the emotional responsiveness of 
the people” (Fanon 30). We will thus ana-
lyze this process of becoming through an 
iconological analysis of the dynamics of 
re-imagination that the national flag 
underwent during the Tunisian revolution. 
However, Fanon extensively warns of pos-
sible pitfalls for national consciousness. 
“Instead of being the all-embracing crys-
tallization of the innermost hopes of the 
whole people”, it can become nothing 
more than an “empty shell” confined in a 
mimetical sterile formalism, doomed to 
become a caricature of itself (Wretched of 
the Earth 148). Consequently, “the masses 
[…] do not manage, in spite of public 
ho lidays and flags, new and brightly col-
ored though they may be, to convince 
themselves that anything has really 
changed” (169). If it does not want to 
become a caricature of itself, mystified by 
mere formalism, nationalism, understood 
as the consciousness of the spontaneity of 
liberation struggle, has to be explicitly dis-
solved into a dignifying project that, 
through a conscious and sovereign sub-
jectivity, answers concrete economic and 
social needs. When this transformation 
happens, nationalist symbols would 
become superfluous as “the nation des-
erts these brightly lit, empty shells and 
takes shelter in the country, where it is 
given life and dynamic power” (204). In 
such a dignified humanist regime, “the liv-
ing expression of the nation is the moving 
consciousness of the whole of the peo-
ple” as “it is the coherent, enlightened 
action of men and women” (204). In 
Tunisia, the liberation was indeed imbued 
with a unifying national consciousness 
facilitated by the flag. However, the nation-
alist colors have not yet dissolved into a 
dignifying societal project that tackles the 
concrete economic and social needs that 
motivated the initial movement. On the 
contrary, youth unemployment seems 
even to increase.1 In the meantime, the 
official national flag was massively repro-
duced, and the bigger the better, instigat-
ing a caricatural national pride as an 
answer to the spontaneous proliferation 
of the Black Standard and different sym-
bolic actions of flag desecration.
The pervading reproduction and ubiquity 
of the gradually reinstated banner in its 
official pictorial structure since the sum-
mer of 2013, and certainly since the pro-
mulgation of the new constitution in 2014, 
are – as we will argue – not only paradoxi-
cally witness to the very limitation of the 
power of icons to engender dignified 
relationalities within a given nation, but 
are also witness to the slow closure of the 
revolutionary space and the gradual 
blockage of revolutionary processes of 
subject formation. This blockage was pro-
ductive for the precarious restoration of 
national unity and state prestige neces-
sary for the completion of the new consti-
tution, but less for the demands for li berty, 
social justice and dignity so central to the 
revolution. 
An iconological analysis of the national 
flag
Building upon the nation’s colors and 
forms, the Ben ‘Ali regime kept up an 
exceptional image of itself, creating a 
“Tunisian fiction” (Hibou Force de 
l’Obéissance). This constructed fiction, 
constituted by an entangled web of inter-
connected mythologies, obfuscated a 
reality of severe economic inequality, 
excessive state violence and alienation of 
traditional morals and religious references 
(Cavatorta and Haugbølle “End of 
Authoritarian”). The revolution, however, 
fiercely punctured the official image of the 
Tunisian exception and fundamentally 
transformed the prevailing image of 
Tunisia and its underlying subjectivities, as 
through the reclamation of the right to 
look at these – until recently hidden – eco-
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nomic and political problems, new subjec-
tivities are formed (Mirzoeff “Right to 
Look”). Visibility was the strength of the 
revolutionary movement, as it turned the 
structure of the surveillance state against 
itself (Tripp “Art, Power”). In the storm of 
images that accompanied the revolution, 
an “iconography of anonymity” could 
indeed be ascertained, as the ubiquitous 
portrait of the autocratic leader was mas-
sively destroyed, as observed by W.J.T. 
Mitchell (“Image, Space” 9). However, “the 
image that promised to become a monu-
ment” was not the image of empty space, 
but the lively processes of reversal, appro-
priation and rejection of the national flag, 
at least in the Tunisian context.  For Eriksen 
and Jenkins in Flag, Nation and Symbolism 
in Europe and America, a flag is a con-
densed symbol that imagines cohesion 
and solidarity in a given nation-state. 
Through its multi-vocality it can efficiently 
imagine the unity of complex and hetero-
geneous societies, as it encompasses a 
diversity of possible interpretations. At the 
same time it is always historically rooted in 
a certain cultural and political past and 
associated with specific interests, and thus 
it categorically excludes certain minorities. 
However, the flag can undergo processes 
of pictorial transformation over time. The 
more multi-vocal a flag, the lower its 
reductionist, essentialist, conflictual or 
even murderous potentialities in concrete 
political situations. Hence, it is the simulta-
neous unifying and dividing character of 
the flag that makes it an iconological site 
and thus a barometer of (potential) con-
flicts. Even though it is broadly assumed to 
be “the most revered among symbols, 
icons and markers associated with nation 
and nationalism in [the] twentieth-century” 
(Jha, Reverence, Resistance 2), conflicts 
over the delineation of a given nation can 
be scrutinized by analyzing the way the 
flag is received in a given society. 
The spontaneity of the revolutionary pro-
cess demands empirically grounded 
methodologies to capture the dissemina-
tion and contention of power and agency 
to thoroughly understand the struggle 
over the formation of political subjectivi-
ties (LeVine “Theorizing Revolutionary”). 
As suggested by Lina Khatib in Image 
Politics, the iconological struggle over 
presence and visibility through competing 
images took center stage during the revo-
lution. The image, as a “construct infused 
with meanings, attributes and projected 
perceptions”, was invested by different 
actors as a key site of political struggle, not 
only for the construction of social and 
political realities, but also for the legitima-
tion of emerging subjectivities (Khatib 
2-3). Following the pictorial turn intro-
duced by W.J.T. Mitchell in his book Picture 
Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual 
Representation, this analysis proposes to 
contribute to a fundamental and critical 
understanding of images in their own 
right, beyond their presupposed semiotic 
and linguistic structure. By delving into the 
dynamic pictorial structure of the national 
flag and the proliferation of its diversion 
and subversion through different online 
and offline media by different revolutio-
nary protagonists, I hope to contribute to 
the ongoing analytical-methodological 
inquiry of the political productivity of 
mass-mediated icons (Haugbølle and 
Kuzmanovic “New Sociology”). 
Unresolved historical questions
Struck by an image of the national flag 
bending over a revolting city with a bleed-
ing eye in its red center in the front-page 
of a journal, Hela Béji’s dream of a new 
humanism collapsed. This image of pro-
found discontent was not related to the 
latest revolution, but to the historical Black 
Thursday of 1978, when the government 
killed about 200 protesters during the first 
general strike since independence. Tunisia 
fell into what Béji calls in her work 
Désenchantement National: Essai sur la 
Décolonisation “national disenchant-
ment”. Following independence, the 
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go vernment reinforced a process of 
Tunisification, to radiate a strong national 
subjectivity that, unlike during colonial 
times, gained the support of the totality of 
the population, beyond pre-nationalist 
pluralistic clan and tribal collectivities 
(Anderson Social Transformation; Sadiki 
“Search for Citizenship”). Tunisian-ness 
had to be invented to oppose colonial 
rule (Sadiki “Search for Citizenship”). Since 
1922, the then still-subversive image of the 
flag was proudly reclaimed and bran-
dished by the liberation movement 
formed around the new militant nationalist 
Destour movement (Lewis Divided Rule), 
pictorially relating to an oppositional sub-
jectivity grounded in Islamic terms. With 
the successful rise of the Neo-Destour, 
however, these terms were slowly re-
negotiated in the direction of more terri-
torially oriented and national rather than 
religious belongings (Sadiki “Search for 
Citizenship”). Illustrative in this light is the 
mythical story of actress Habiba Msika 
causing a scandal in 1928 during the pre-
mière of The Martyrs of Liberty, as she got 
arrested by the colonial authorities who 
prohibited the play after she wrapped her-
self in the Tunisian flag and chanted slo-
gans of liberation. With independence, 
the French flag, which was officially 
hoisted during the proclamation of the 
occupation in 1881 at the Kasbah in Tunis, 
was replaced (Cattedra “Où est la 
Kasbah?”). The Tunisian flag initially visual-
ized the national process of subject forma-
tion, from an interiorized inferiority as 
colonial object, to the Tunisian people as 
subject of its own history. After indepen-
dence, however, divisions within the Neo-
Destour came to the surface. Its Arab 
Nationalist stream was violently marginal-
ized, together with the elimination of its 
leader Salah Ben Youssef in 1961. The 
Bourguibist stream reinforced its national-
ist ideology but took a secular turn in the 
imagination of the nation, mimicking 
Western modernization (Sadiki ). As the 
regime moved towards authoritarianism 
and the socialist experiment of the 1960s 
was abandoned, the masses were con-
fronted with the alienating and oppressive 
nature of the ideals of the nation-state 
turned authori tar ian (Béj i 
Désenchantement National). Moreover, 
efforts of national unification and homog-
enization hegemonized and singularized 
in an exclusive way the political landscape, 
precluding political dissidence in general, 
but especially Islamist subjectivities (Sadiki 
“The Search for Citizenship”). Behind the 
façade of the homogeneous nation, the 
regional marginalization of the interior 
and south of the country that originated in 
the colonial era, and the class division this 
entailed, remained unaddressed and 
were consolidated by the post-colonial 
regime (Mullin “Tunisian Uprising”). The 
national flag was hollowed and reduced 
to the background of the portrait of a long 
expired authoritarian and patrimonial 
leader. Nonetheless, the crescent and star 
survived the Bourguiba era. It even under-
went a short revival, as it was embraced by 
the newly instated Ben ‘Ali regime. The 
flag, however, was quickly seized by the 
regime and soon no longer reflected 
national belonging, but association with 
the ruling party (Bouzouita “Coulisses de 
la Revolution”). As the coercive character 
of the state was further legitimized through 
a sustained Islamist threat (Sadiki “The 
Search for Citizenship”), the colors of the 
nation were further hollowed-out as an 
essential and non-negotiable element in 
the repertoire of performance of regime 
adherence. In 1999 the national flag’s pic-
torial structure was officially defined at the 
level of the law, further elaborating the 4th 
article of the Republican Constitution of 
1959. To breathe life into the captured flag, 
the Ministry of National Defense pub-
lished a collective book entirely dedicated 
to the national flag in June 2006, attempt-
ing to infuse the national symbol with pre-
Islamic historical legitimacy. The process 
of national disenchantment rapidly inten-
sified under Ben ‘Ali, leaving only a “façade 
of national uniformity” (Dakhli "Tunisian 
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National Interest" 90), an empty shell hid-
ing state corruption and the continued 
marginalization of Tunisia’s peripheries.  
Re-appropriating the national colors
Despite its extensive use as an exclusive 
symbol of power during the successive 
authoritarian regimes, the revolutionary 
masses in 2011 reappropriated the 
national flag together with its moral and 
political legitimacy, facilitating a unifica-
tion and nationalization of the protest 
(Bouzouita “Coulisses de la Révolution”; 
Hawkins “Teargas, Flags”). The national 
symbol still floated in the streets as a sym-
bol of power during the initial locally dis-
persed clashes between the mobilized 
youth and security forces in the interior 
and south of the country. The massive 
diversion of the flag used as profile pic-
tures on social media, constructed a vir-
tual representation of a united people 
that preceded its physical unification. It 
was only when the masses felt that 
together they could topple the president 
that the flag was also physically reappro-
priated and waved offline. During the ini-
tial liberation, virtually subverted flags 
formally mourned the sacrifice of the mar-
tyrs. Once Ben ‘Ali fled, however, a cele-
bratory and embodied aesthetic empha-
sized the pride and hope of a successful 
revolution on- and offline. The reappro-
priation of the rallying image of the 
national flag by the struggling population 
not only facilitated their unification, but 
also punctured the idealized image of the 
Tunisian exception, rendering visible the 
state of corruption and intensified mar-
ginalization outside the capital and 
coastal regions.
After Ben ‘Ali was toppled, revolutionary 
demands to overthrow the government 
still in place were pushed by disenfran-
chised youth who had traveled from the 
interior and the south to the capital and 
occupied the Kasbah square, where the 
Prime Minister and his government hold 
office. Through the Freedom Caravan and 
the occupation of the Kasbah, the masses 
rediscovered an oppressed part of the 
national self (Saidi “Traveling”). The reap-
propriated national banner was quintes-
sential in the performed occupation of 
the square, not only as a cape in the strug-
gle against a persisting government, but 
also as a blanket covering historical 
regional, class and political divisions. The 
flag altogether incorporated the subjec-
tivities previously overshadowed in what 
Fanon calls a “zone of nonbeing” (Black 
Skin 2).  Diverse subjectivities underlying 
the feelings of injustice related to the 
access to land in the interior-south, the 
extraction of natural resources in the min-
ing regions, the repression of informal 
local economies at the border with Libya, 
and the corruption in the urban coastal 
centers and the capital were unified at the 
Kasbah (Zemni “Revolution”). Under the 
national banner, those inhabiting this 
zone of non-being reclaimed their sover-
eign right to be.
However, not everyone cheered the arrival 
of the Freedom Caravan. A call for a return 
to normality was voiced during manifesta-
tions at the Kobbah in Al Menzah, echoing 
the will of the interim government of 
National Unity, gathering against what 
they considered a radical minority that 
would destabilize the country’s economy 
and security. They demanded clear lead-
ership in the name of a silent majority, also 
identifying in patriotic terms, for the good 
of the Tunisian nation (Chennaoui 
“Kasbah”; Zemni “Extraordinary Politics”). 
Though both the Kasbah and Kobbah pro-
testers acted under the same national 
banner, conflicting subjectivities were at 
stake (Zemni “Revolution”). After the fall of 
the interim government of National Unity, 
the occupation of the Kasbah made way 
for a collective but bumpy journey to the 
country’s first free elections. From the 
moment street politics were translated to 
new official political structures and institu-
tions, the revolutionary space closed 
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down and the formation of revolutionary 
subjectivities was challenged and – as we 
will see – sometimes even blocked from 
the political game (LeVine “Theorizing 
Revolutionary”). 
National Re-imagination
The debates in the elected National 
Constitutional Assembly and the newly 
appointed transition government were 
pushed forth by three contentious phases 
of national re-imagination. In a first phase, 
the national flag underwent a wave of 
desecration and the Black Standard 
gained more and more visibility. In a sec-
ond phase, the national flag was revita-
lized as the country mourned its first poli-
tical killings. Finally, the flag was massively 
waved in front of the Bardo square to 
demand, in vain, the dissolution of the 
constitutional assembly.  
It all started at Manouba University when, 
during protests, an activist climbed up the 
roof of the janitor’s building and, thanks to 
another student, in vain tried to replace 
the Tunisian flag with the Black Standard.2 
The incident rapidly grew from a local stu-
dent opposition to a nationwide political 
question (Le Pape “Peut-on Convertir”), 
and was but the first in a series of actions 
questioning the outline of the nation and 
out-loud “recalling the caliphate” (Sayyid, 
Recalling the Caliphate 186). More Salafi-
oriented Islamist groups settled in differ-
ent places in Tunisia’s peripheries and 
hoisted the black flag. Under the impulse 
of the later-outlawed Salafi-jihadist move-
ment Anṣār al-Sharīʿa, Islamist symbols 
were adopted and ostensibly waved dur-
ing different actions and mobilizations 
(Merone “Social Contention”). When, after 
the diffusion of the film Innocence of 
Muslims in September 2012, the American 
Embassy was attacked by Salafi activists, 
they replaced the American flag with the 
Black Standard. The pinnacle of this phase 
of flag desecration was the mobilization 
during the Holy Koran Day, proclaimed by 
the Minister of Religious Affairs 
Noureddine El Khademi of the an-Nahḍa 
party to protest against ongoing profana-
tions of the Koran. Thousands of Islamist 
activists gathered on the newly renamed 
January 14 Square demanding the imple-
mentation of the Sharīʿa, while seven of 
the best trained protesters waved their 
black banner on the highest point of the 
clock tower. The Al-Amen party suggested 
as a compromise in the Constitutive 
Assembly to add the calligraphic inscrip-
tion of the Shahada to the national flag, to 
no avail. To counterbalance the ongoing 
phase of desecration, the transitional 
go vernment packed the central clock 
tower with the national flag on the second 
and third anniversary of the revolution. 
A second phase of national re-imagina-
tion started with the murder of the lead-
ing member of the Popular Front, Chokri 
Belaïd. His funeral provoked a national 
mobilization, unseen since the days of the 
Kasbah. The people reused the banner as 
a blanket to cover national mourning. In 
response to the French Minister of the 
Interior, who linked the assassination to 
the rise of Islamic fascism, the French flag 
was ostentatiously burned. The pro-an-
Nahḍa demonstrations following the 
assassination were not homogenous red 
and white, but also colored blue, red and 
white, referring to the colors of the party. 
The black standards were also present, 
engendering further suspicion with the 
opposition. To strengthen the support of 
the army in the escalating fights with 
jihadist cells, the government hoisted a 
giant national flag on top of Mount 
Chaâmbi. Finally, during the national cel-
ebrations for Women’s Day and the anni-
versary of the institution of the progres-
sive personal code, national forms and 
colors again took center stage, this time 
as a trending clothing style. Another 
fe minist strategy was used by Femen 
when burning the Black Standard in front 
















Figure 2: “There is no allegiance, but to Tunisia 
Allah”. Dakhli, “Tunisian National Interest”, Tunisia, 
2013.
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surfing on the ongoing wave of “hyper-
bolization of national pride” (Dakhli 
“Tunisian National Interest”), the ministry 
of tourism successfully challenged the 
world record for the largest flag. In his 
Ascent of a Nation, Tahar Manai proudly 
planted the Tunisian flag on the top of the 
Himalayas, conquering the highest peak 
in the world. With the project Tounes Alia 
the banner even fluttered in the strato-
sphere. After the attack at the Imperial 
Marhaba Hotel at Port El Kantaoui, presi-
dent Béji Caïd Essebsi called on the Prime 
Minister to revise the license granted to a 
political party still waving the black flag, 
alluding to Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, the last Pan-
Islamist party still recognized by the 
go vernment. At the same time, a social 
media campaign went viral featuring post-
cards of terror attacks in Western capitals, 
posing the question of whether you would 
also stop visiting Paris after the Charlie 
attacks, New York after 9/11 or London 
after the 7/7 bombings. 
In contrast with the worldwide indignation 
at attacks in the heart of Europe, after the 
third jihadist attack targeting the presiden-
tial guard on the Mohamed V Boulevard, 
indignation grew as there was with no 
security check nor a flag–layer designed 
on social media for solidarity with Tunisia. 
As in the aftermath of the second Paris 
attacks in November that same year, 
where international buildings in different 
world cities effectively colored white red 
and blue, photoshopped images went 
viral depicting the Statue of Liberty in New 
York and The Eiffel Tower, among others, 
in red and white. The collective wound 
caused by the three consecutive jihadist 
assaults were healed with the multiplica-
tion of national colors during different 
manifestations mourning the victims and 
condemning Islamist politics in general. 
Finally, in March 2017, on the occasion of 
the 61st anniversary of independence, the 
government inaugurated the newly built 
National Flag Square and raised a giant 
flag up the flagpole in Belvedere Park, 
overseeing the whole capital from its 
height. Whereas the reception of the three 
consecutive jihadist attacks clearly alluded 
to the international dimension of the poli-
tical problems Tunisia is facing today, an 
already hyperbolic national pride further 
intensified in a caricatural way. 
Subjectivities could no longer be ima-
gined outside the constitutional compro-
mise sharply delineated by the imposed 
pictorial structure of the national flag. 
Conclusion
The creative re-appropriation and diver-
sion of the national flag during the initial 
liberation phase was an essential mediator 
of the unity necessary for pushing forward 
revolutionary demands. Even a short time 
after Ben ‘Ali was toppled, the national flag 
held the people together beyond histori-
cal regional, generational, class and poli-
tical differences, as it lost its rigid form and 
underwent a process of pictorial transfor-
mation. It no longer imagined allegiance 
to the regime, but revolutionary affiliation, 
sacrifice, liberty, justice, dignity, inter-
regional unity and cross-class solidarity. 
United under the colors of the nation, 
excluded subjectivities reclaimed their 
sovereign right to be.  The very symbol of 
this unity, however, quickly became a sub-
ject in a violent battlefield, following three 
contentious phases of re-imagination, fur-
ther addressing unresolved historical 
issues. From the Manouba incident, 
through the national mourning of political 
opposition figures such as Chokri Belaid 
and the red card pulled in front of the 
Bardo, to the creation of National Flag 
Square on the hilltop of Belvedere Park, 
the youth unemployment, the postcolo-
nial regional marginalization of the interior 
and south of the country and the related 
class divisions largely remain unad-
dressed. Though the national flag is sup-
posed to mark its Islamic adherence once 
necessary to mobilize against French colo-
nial occupation, it was contested by new 
emerging Islamist subjectivities and later 
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by more Salafist- and jihadist-asserted 
subjectivities coloring outside the lines of 
the nation. This contradiction points to a 
pictorial transformation of the flag 
throughout history, as it seems to depict 
religious alienation rather than the Islamic 
imaginary it is supposed to trigger. 
The national flag hence lost its foundation 
and thus its multi-vocality and capacity to 
imagine national unity beyond historic 
divisions, not only categorically excluding 
nascent ambiguous Salafist- and jihadist-
oriented Islamist subjectivities that contest 
the constitutional compromise of 2014, 
but also the once-unified subjectivities 
underlying the feelings of injustice related 
to access to land,  the extraction of natural 
resources, the repression of informal local 
economies and prevailing corruption. 
When street politics was translated into 
official political structures after the occu-
pation of the Kasbah, the ongoing forma-
tion of revolutionary subjectivities was 
challenged, and after three tragic jihadist 
attacks even blocked from the political 
game. The recovery from this last phase of 
deadly contention assured the consolida-
tion of the historical compromise that 
underpinned the new constitution. 
However, the further intensification of the 
hyberbolization of national pride, from the 
world record of biggest flag or the need 
to send the national colors to the strato-
sphere, convincingly shows how – unfortu-
nately – the nation became a caricature of 
itself. 
Together with the loss of its multi-vocal 
capacities, the flag re-activated a certain 
reductionist, essentialist and even oppres-
sive potentiality. The re-imposition of the 
official pictorial structure of the national 
flag, and the blockage of revolutionary 
forms of becoming it facilitated, were pro-
ductive for the restoration of national unity 
and state prestige, but less so for the 
demands for liberty, social justice and dig-
nity. As argued by Fanon in The Wretched 
of the Earth, if a given state wants to be 
national, it does not need to over-empha-
size the forms of its flag, how beautifully 
colored it might be. It just has to give “form 
and body” to the prevailing national con-
sciousness of liberation and find a way to 
constitute a dignifying state “by the peo-
ple and for the people, for the outcasts 
and by the outcasts” (Fanon 205). 
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2 The flag incident at the Ma-
nouba was the first real case 
of flag desecration. However, 
the rapper Pscyho-M in De-
cember 2010 – that is a month 
before the start of the revo-
lution – already distanced 
himself politically from the 
national flag in favor of what 
he calls the Tawhid Flag in his 
popular song ‘Manipulation’ 
(Ovshieva “Stomping for Tu-
nisia”; Benyoussef “Gender”). 
Known for his sharp letter to 
the president “Rais LeBled”, 
rapper El General followed 
the Islamist proposition in 
his song “Allahu Akbar”, 
declaring “The banner of 
Islam always comes first” 
(El General “Allahu Akbar”). 
The enormous popularity of 
both artists is evidence of the 
broad popular support for 
radical Islamist ideologies 
among youth.
Notes
1 The youth unemployment 
rate is excessively high and 
almost doubled between 
2006 and 2014, increasing 
from 17% to 31.4% by 2014. 
Figures regarding access to 
work also point to gendered 
inequalities. Women (43.5%) 
suffer from unemployment 
more than men (20.9%). In-
equalities also affect regions. 
In the central west [of the 
country], the unemployment 
rate stands at 28.6%; 26.9% 
in the southwest; 24.8% in 
the southeast; and 11.1% in 
the central east. The structu-
ral imbalances that initially 
triggered the Tunisian revo-
lution have thus continued 
to increase (Zammit “Tunisia 
Groaning”)
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